UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-8-2017

Marr v. State Respondent's Brief 3 Dckt. 44185

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Marr v. State Respondent's Brief 3 Dckt. 44185" (2017). Not Reported. 3328.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3328

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOHN J. MARR,
No. 44185
Petitioner-Respondent,

V.

CV-2014-9405

STATE OF IDAHO,

Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE JOHN R. STEGNER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KENNETH K. JORGENSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100
(208)-334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

CRAIG H. DURHAM
Ferguson Durham, PLLC
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325
Boise, Idaho, 83702
(208)-345-5183
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

FEB O8 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... l

Nature of the Case ................................................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings ............................................................. 1

SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE AND ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 2

The District Court did not err in concluding that Mr. Marr's trial counsel was also
ineffective in failing to cross-examine Ms. Jones when she appeared to be under the
influence while testifying at trial. ...... ·........................................................................................ 2

1.

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 2

2.

Standard of Review .................................................................................................... 2

3.

Legal Standards Governing Claims of Ineffective Assistance ............................. 2

4.

The District Court's Finding of Ineffective Assistance is Supported by the
Record .......................................................................................................................... 3

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7,319 P.3d 491 (2014) ........................................................... .3
Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 975 P.3d 782 (1999) ....................................................... .2
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................................. .3

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from District Judge John R. Stegner's Judgment vacating
Respondent John Marr's conviction for felony domestic battery. This is Mr. Marr's
Supplemental Brief addressing the issue raised in the Supplemental Brief of Appellant.
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The facts and course of proceedings are set out in previous briefing.
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SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE AND ARGUMENT

The District Court did not err in concluding that Mr. Marr's trial counsel was also
ineffective in failing to cross-examine Ms. Jones when she appeared to be under the
influence while testifying at trial.
1.

Introduction

Marci Jones' s excessive alcohol use and temperament weaves its way throughout
this case. Despite that, it was addressed only obliquely at Mr. Marr's criminal trial
because of trial counsel's unreasonable errors. Most notably, trial counsel missed the
connection between Ms. Jones's character while drinking and self-defense. But she also
ignored Mr. Marr's warning to her that Jones had been drinking before she took the
stand. The district court was correct to recognize the importance of this issue, its strong
tie to the themes in this case, and trial counsel's unreasonable failure to follow-up in
anyway.
2.

Standard of Review

The standard is set out in the parties' earlier briefing: in a post-conviction matter,
this Court defers to the District Court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 495-96, 975 P.3d 782, 783-84 (1999). This Court
then exercises free review over the District Court's application of law to those facts. (Id.)
3.

Legal Standards Governing Claims of Ineffective Assistance

A defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel when (1) his counsel committed errors fell below an objective
2

standard of reasonableness and (2) he suffered actual prejudice as a result. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); accord Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 10-11, 319
P.3d 491, 494-95 (2014). Prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S at 694. A reasonable probability
is one that is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
4.

The District Court's Finding of Ineffective Assistance is Supported by the
Record

John Marr told his trial counsel that Marci Jones had a problem with alcohol
"every single time [they] talked." (EH Tr., p. 15: 23-34.) He told her that when Ms. Jones
was drinking she became "belligerent and aggressive." (EH Tr., p. 15: 25, p. 16: 1-2.)
Trial counsel knew that Ms. Jones had a record of "misdemeanors related to drinking."
(EH Tr., p. 20: 19-20.) She testified that it was "pretty obvious" that Ms. Jones had a
reputation for drinking to excess and becoming belligerent or aggressive.
Against that backdrop, Ms. Jones appeared in a "shaky" condition at the criminal
trial and was mumbling her words during her testimony. (EH Tr., p. 24: 19-25.) When
trial counsel asked Mr. Marr whether he thought Ms. Jones had been drinking that day,
Mr. Marr told counsel that it appeared that she had, but counsel was dismissive because
he "always said yes." (EH Tr., p. 25: 8.) She asked one question-when the last time Ms.
Jones had a drink- but did not follow-up when the court overruled an objection. (JT Tr.,
p. 118: 9-22.) She agreed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that cross-examining
Ms. Jones's about her condition while testifying would be fair impeachment. (EH Tr., p.
3

25: 15-18.) She gave no tactical reason for asking a single question before dropping the
matter altogether.
There is enough in this record to find that Marci Jones appeared to be under the
influence at the criminal trial. John Marr had personal experience with Ms. Jones' s
behavior and he notified his counsel of Jones' s condition. Trial counsel admitted that
she appeared "shaky" and "mumbly," and that her condition "was on [her] radar."
Regardless whether Ms. Jones would have admitted that she was drunk, Mr.
Marr contends that it was ineffective assistance not to question her. It would have been
fertile ground for cross-examination in any event. Counsel could have again asked Ms.
Jones if she had anything to drink that day. If she said yes, then counsel could explore
her ability to recall and remember the events accurately. If she said no, then counsel
could follow up with questions about whether it was normal for her to mumble her
words or to appear shaky when speaking. The jury could draw the obvious conclusions,
undermining Ms. Jones's credibility further. It is apparent that the jury did not believe
her entirely, as it acquitted Mr. Marr of attempted strangulation. This type of
questioning would have implicitly looped back and reminded the jury of Ms. Jones' s
character trait for hostility and belligerence while drunk, had counsel investigated and
developed that theme.
For these reasons, Mr. Marr asks the Court to uphold the district court on both
grounds.
4

CONCLUSION

Mr. Marr respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court.
Respectfully submitted on this 8th day of February, 2017.

Craig Durham
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Supplemental Brief of Respondent has been served on the
following persons on this 8th day of February, 2016, by depositing copies in the United
States Mail, postage pre-paid and addressed to:

KENNETH K. JORGENSON

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100
JOHNJ.MARR

#103124
PO Box 14
Boise ID 83707

Craig H. Du~am
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